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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  This immigration matter has already been before this 
Court once before on a petition for review.  Bernardo Castillo 
previously petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal 
from an order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his 
application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
1229b(a).  Granting his petition, we remanded this matter to 
the BIA for it to determine whether Castillo—who was found 
guilty by a municipal court of shoplifting, a disorderly 
persons offense under New Jersey law—was thereby 
“‘convicted of [a] crime[ ]” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).   On remand, the BIA concluded that this 
finding of guilt constituted a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(48)(A) and, therefore, a crime under § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The BIA accordingly dismissed Castillo’s 
administrative appeal, and Castillo filed another petition for 
review.  For the second time in this case, we will grant his 
petition for review and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 Castillo is a native and citizen of Peru.  He entered the 
United States without inspection in 1985, became a temporary 
resident in 1988, and adjusted his status to lawful permanent 
residency in 1990.  On September 31, 1994, the East 
Brunswick Municipal Court found Castillo guilty of 
shoplifting in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11.  
Castillo evidently was represented by an attorney and entered 
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a guilty plea to this offense.  He was ordered to pay a $200 
fine, together with costs in the amount of $55 as well as $81 
in various fees.  In 1989, Castillo was convicted in a New 
Jersey court of receiving stolen property.  He was 
subsequently convicted, on three separate occasions, on 
charges of receiving stolen property and, on one occasion, on 
a charge of contempt. 
 
 Castillo admitted his criminal history and conceded 
removability, while requesting relief from removal on a 
number of grounds.  Specifically, he claimed that he was 
eligible for cancellation of removal pursuant to § 1229b(a).  
Section 1229b(a) provides that the Attorney General may 
cancel the removal of an alien who, inter alia, has “resided in 
the United States continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status.”  Continuous residence, however, ends 
“when the alien has committed an offense referred to in 
section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien . . . 
removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) . . 
. of this title.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B).  “Under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an alien is removable, inter alia, if he ‘is 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, 
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.’”  
Castillo v. Attorney General, 411 F. App’x 500, 501 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 
 The IJ denied relief and ordered Castillo’s removal.  
According to the IJ, “his criminal history . . . reveals a 
conviction for shoplifting” in 1994 as well as a 1989 
conviction for receiving stolen property.  (A26.)  The IJ said 
that “a conviction for shoplifting, even if categorized as a 
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disorderly persons offense, can be considered a conviction for 
a crime involving moral turpitude,” which, together with the 
1989 conviction, rendered Castillo removable and ended his 
continuous physical presence short of the requisite 7-year 
period.  (Id.) 
 
 The BIA dismissed Castillo’s appeal in a single-
member decision dated May 6, 2009.  The agency concluded 
that “the Immigration Judge’s determination that the 
respondent’s 1994 conviction constitutes a crime involving 
moral turpitude is supported by the record.”  (A12.)  It 
specifically rejected Castillo’s theory that his shoplifting 
offense should be considered a disorderly persons offense—
rather than a crime: 
 
Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-11(c), there are 4 
gradations of shoplifting offenses.  Three are 
crimes and one is a disorderly persons offense.  
The respondent has the burden of establishing 
his eligibility for any requested relief from 
removal.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).  If the 
evidence indicates (as is the case here) that one 
or more grounds for mandatory denial of the 
application for relief may apply, the alien shall 
have the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.  
Id.  As there is no evidence in this case that the 
respondent’s shoplifting offense was prosecuted 
as a disorderly persons offense rather than a 
crime, the respondent has not met his burden of 
 6 
establishing that he is eligible for cancellation 
of removal under [§ 1229b(a)].  
 
(A12-A13.)  In a footnote, the BIA acknowledged that 
Castillo cited to its prior decision in In re Eslamizar, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004) (en banc), but observed that “there 
was evidence in [Eslamizar] establishing that a prosecutor 
had elected to treat the offense at issue as something other 
than a crime,” and “[s]uch evidence is lacking in this case.”  
(A12 n.1.) 
 
 Castillo filed a petition for review with this Court.  In a 
January 11, 2011 order, we granted his petition for review 
and remanded this matter to the BIA for further proceedings 
consistent with our opinion. 
 
 In his previous petition, Castillo asserted that “the BIA 
erred in ruling that his shoplifting conviction was for a 
‘crime’ because under New Jersey law at the time, shoplifting 
was not a ‘crime,’ but rather ‘a disorderly persons offense.’”  
Castillo, 411 F. App’x at 502 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:20-11(c) (1994)).  He therefore pointed out that under 
1994 New Jersey law:  (1) disorderly persons offenses were 
petty offenses—and not crimes within the meaning of the 
New Jersey Constitution; (2) there was no right to a trial by 
jury or to an indictment by a grand jury; (3) a conviction did 
not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage; and (4) 
“[i]n carrying its burden of proving the element of the 
disorderly persons offense of shoplifting that the defendant 
intended to deprive the merchant of possession, the state is 
aided by a presumption arising from intentional concealed 
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possession of merchandise while on the merchant’s property,” 
id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11(d) (1994)).  Castillo 
also relied on the BIA’s decision in Eslamizar, “in which the 
respondent had been found guilty of a ‘violation’ of an 
Oregon statute prohibiting shoplifting.”  Id.  We provided the 
following summary of that agency decision: 
 
Oregon law defined “crimes” and “violations” 
in mutually exclusive terms, and conviction of a 
“violation” did “not give rise to any disability 
or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a 
crime.”  [Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 687].  
Under its law, prosecutions of “violations” 
involved proceedings which differed from those 
in criminal proceedings in that, among other 
things, the state needed only to prove guilt by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  The IJ 
concluded that the “Oregon judgment issued 
against the respondent did not qualify as a 
‘conviction’ for a ‘crime’ that could give rise to 
immigration consequences.”  Id. at 685.  The 
BIA agreed with this conclusion.  Id. n. 2.  Its 
analysis placed primary emphasis on the INA 
[Immigration and Nationality Act] definition of 
“conviction” found in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(48)(A).  While acknowledging that the 
respondent had been “convicted” under the 
literal reading of that statutory definition, the 
BIA ultimately concluded that “by ‘judgment of 
guilt’ Congress most likely intended to refer to 
a judgment in a criminal proceeding, that is, a 
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trial or other proceeding whose purpose is to 
determine whether the accused committed a 
crime and which provides the constitutional 
safeguards normally attendant upon criminal 
adjudication.”  Id. at 687 (italics in original).  
The judgment against the respondent was found 
not to meet this understanding of the phrase 
“judgment of guilt.”  The BIA did not speak 
further on whether the respondent had 
committed a “crime” that could give rise to 
immigration consequences. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 We then pointed out that the BIA in Castillo’s case 
failed to reach the issue of whether he “was ‘convicted of [a] 
crime[ ]’” under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because “it applied the 
then current version of the New Jersey statute rather than the 
version in effect at the time of Castillo’s offense.”  Id. at 503.  
In 1994, all four gradations of shoplifting were disorderly 
persons offenses.  We accordingly could not sustain the 
BIA’s decision based on its own stated rationale.   
 
In short, “[t]here is no doubt that Castillo was found 
guilty of a disorderly persons offense and the issue of whether 
that constitutes being ‘convicted of [a] crime[ ]’ within the 
meaning of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) cannot be avoided.”  Id.  
However, this Court declined to address this question in the 
first instance because “it is an issue of some substance” and 
“we owe Chevron deference to the BIA’s reading of the 
statutes whose execution it oversees.”  Id.  We thus remanded 
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“to secure the benefit of the BIA’s understanding of the 
phrase ‘convicted of [a] crime[ ]’ as used in § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).”  Id. 
 
While indicating that Castillo’s due process theory, 
which tracked the foregoing statutory construction argument, 
“should await the disposition of that statutory argument,” we 
did reject the government’s assertion that the application of 
the 2006 version of the state statute constituted harmless 
error: 
 
While it is true that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) 
defines the term “conviction” for purposes of 
the INA and that the definition is “not 
dependent on the vagaries of state law,” 
Appellee’s Br. at 21 n. 7, the issue posed by 
Castillo turns on whether he was “convicted of 
[a] crime[ ]” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  That is clearly a question of 
federal, not state law, but it is not one directly 
answered in the INA or the BIA’s opinion in 
Eslamizar.  While the statutory definition of 
“conviction” may be found to assist in the 
analysis, even given that definition, one must 
still ask “conviction” of what. 
 
Id. 
 The BIA, in a single-member decision dated March 29, 
2012, purportedly responded to this Court’s request that “we 
address whether the respondent’s conviction in this case 
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constitutes a ‘crime’ for purposes of [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)].” 
(A5.)  The BIA, for a second time, affirmed the IJ’s decision 
and dismissed Castillo’s appeal.  It did so based on the 
following grounds: 
 
 In Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684 
(BIA 2004), we found that the respondent’s 
conviction for third-degree theft under Oregon 
law did not qualify as a conviction for a crime 
under [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] because it did not 
qualify as a “conviction” under [§ 
1101(a)(48)(A)].  We determined that, in order 
for an offense to qualify as a criminal 
conviction pursuant to [§ 1101(a)(48)(A)], the 
elements of such offense must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In Matter of 
Eslamizar, supra, the theft offense at issue only 
required the State to prove the defendant’s 
violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
 In order for the shoplifting offense at 
issue in the instant case to constitute a “crime” 
under [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)], the elements of 
such offense must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the conviction for such 
offense must constitute a “conviction” under [§ 
1101(a)(48)(A)].  See Matter of Eslamizar, 
supra; see also Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 24 
I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) (finding an 
adjudication of guilt, proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by a general court-martial 
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qualified as a conviction under [§ 
1101(a)(48)(A)]); Matter of Calvera, 24 I&N 
Dec 459 (BIA 2008) (holding that costs and 
surcharges constitute a penalty for purposes of 
establishing a conviction).  Contrary to the 
respondent’s assertions, whether New Jersey 
considers his offense to be a “crime” is not 
relevant.  Matter of G-, 7 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 
1957).  The question is whether Congress 
would have intended the offense to constitute a 
crime under the Act.  Unlike the statute in 
Matter of Eslamizar, supra, the shoplifting 
statue at issue in this case requires the State to 
demonstrate the elements of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2c:20-11 (1994); see also State v. Goodmann, 
390 N.J.Super. 259 (2007) (holding that the 
New Jersey shoplifting statute requires the State 
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the 
elements of the offense).  Thus, the 
respondent’s shoplifting violation constitutes a 
conviction under [§ 1101(a)(48)(A)] and 
therefore a crime under [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)].  
See Hussein v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 413 Fed. Appx. 
431 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (finding 
disorderly persons offense to be “conviction” 
due to imposition of “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard). . . .  
 
(A6.) 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  
This Court reviews the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, 
“subject to the principles of deference articulated in” Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Briseno-Flores 
v. Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Under 
this doctrine, the Court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  
See, e.g., Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 
2003).  “On the other hand, ‘if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.’”  Id. (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  “In its interpretation of the INA, 
‘the BIA should be afforded Chevron deference as it gives 
ambiguous statutory terms “concrete meaning through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication.”’”  Id. (quoting INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).  “[W]here an 
agency interpretation reflects an impermissible construction 
of the statute, we will not defer to the agency’s view.”  Jean-
Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 472 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2009) (citations omitted).  Moreover, “we owe no deference 
to the [administrative] interpretation of a state criminal 
statute.”  Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d 
Cir. 2004)).  The reasonableness of an agency’s statutory 
interpretation is dependent in part on the consistency with 
which the interpretation is advanced.  See, e.g., Valdiviezo-
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Galdamez v. Attorney General, 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 
2011).  
 
III. 
 We remanded this matter specifically “to secure the 
benefit of the BIA’s understanding of the phrase ‘convicted of 
[a] crime[ ]’ as used in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).”  Castillo, 411 F. 
App’x at 503.  With respect to Eslamizar, we noted that the 
BIA focused on the statutory definition of the term 
“conviction” found in § 1101(a)(48)(A), id. at 502, and 
explained that the question of whether Castillo was 
“’convicted of [a] crime[ ]’” pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
was not “directly answered in the INA or the BIA’s opinion 
in Eslamizar,” id. at 503.  We observed that, “[w]hile the 
statutory definition of ‘conviction’ may be found to assist in 
the analysis, even given that definition, one must still ask 
‘conviction’ of what.”  Id.  However, the BIA on remand 
turned to Eslamizar and its reading of § 1101(a)(48)(A) in 
order to decide “whether the respondent’s conviction in this 
case constitutes a ‘crime’ for purposes of [§ 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)].”  (A5.)  It then concluded that “the 
respondent’s shoplifting violation constitutes a conviction 
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under [§ 1101(a)(48)(A)] and therefore a crime under [§ 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)].”1   (A6 (citation omitted).) 
 
Castillo, for his part, does not take issue with the 
BIA’s basic approach to §§ 1101(a)(48)(A) and 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  On the contrary, he specifically argues that 
the BIA committed reversible error—and even “violated its 
own precedential decision in [Eslamizar]”—by concluding 
that the finding of guilt at issue in this matter was a 
conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A).  (Petitioner’s Brief at 19.)  
Accordingly, we turn to § 1101(a)(48)(A) and the agency’s 
decision in Eslamizar. 
 
                                                 
1
  Having ignored our request that it “still ask 
‘conviction’ of what,” Castillo, 411 F. App’x at 503, the BIA 
seems to have construed the INA to mean that any offense for 
which there is a conviction as defined in the statute must 
necessarily be a crime.  But the INA itself evidently 
distinguishes crimes from non-criminal violations, providing, 
for example, that an alien is inadmissible if he or she is 
convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), or of a ““violation . . .  relating to a 
controlled substance,” id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  
Nevertheless, for purposes of this discussion, we assume that 
the same factors that establish whether an alien has suffered a 
conviction as defined in § 1101(a)(48)(A) determine whether 
the offense of conviction is a crime for purposes of the INA.  
As we note hereafter, however, we anticipate that the question 
left open from our last remand—“‘conviction’ of what”—will 
be answered upon remand this time. 
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Section 1101(a)(48)(A) states that: 
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an 
alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien 
entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has 
been withheld, where— 
 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien 
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilt, and 
 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
 
This statutory definition was added to the INA as part of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996.  In re Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484, 487 
(BIA 2008). 
 
Eslamizar was charged with theft in the third degree in 
violation of Oregon state law.  Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 
685.  “Although the offense qualified as a misdemeanor and 
was initially charged as such, Oregon law allowed the 
prosecuting attorney to amend the accusatory pleading so as 
to ‘treat’ the offense as a ‘Class A violation’ rather than as a 
misdemeanor.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  
This election was made, and Eslamizar’s trial was conducted 
in accordance with an Oregon statutory provision that 
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“provides for proceedings that differ from conventional 
criminal prosecutions in that, among other things, the State 
need only prove guilt ‘by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 
rather than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id.  He was found 
guilty and sentenced to pay a nominal fine as well as various 
financial assessments.  Id.  Given a previous misdemeanor 
theft conviction, Eslamizar was charged as removable on the 
grounds that he was an alien convicted of two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Id.  
The IJ “concluded that the September 3, 1999, Oregon 
judgment issued against the respondent did not qualify as a 
‘conviction’ for a ‘crime’ that could rise to immigration 
consequences, because the proceedings in which that 
judgment was entered did not afford the respondent many of 
the constitutional safeguards generally required for criminal 
prosecutions.”  Id. at 685-86. 
  
The BIA originally sustained the government’s appeal, 
holding that the Oregon judgment was a conviction under the 
plain language of § 1101(a)(48)(A).  Id. at 686.  In doing so, 
it cited to an Oregon Supreme Court opinion, which held that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was always required.  Id.  
However, that opinion was superseded by a state statute.  Id.  
“Because of this crucial factual error regarding the 
requirements of Oregon law, as applicable to the respondent’s 
case, we reconsider our prior decision in full, and as 
previously indicated, we arrive at a different legal 
conclusion.”  Id. 
 
According to the agency, “[t]he issue in [Eslamizar] is 
whether a judgment of guilt entered against the respondent in 
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a proceeding conducted pursuant to section 153.076 of the 
Oregon Revised Statues constitutes a ‘conviction’ for 
immigration purposes.”  Id.  On reconsideration, the BIA—in 
a 9-2 en banc decision—ultimately answered this question in 
the negative.  Id. at 689. 
 
In doing so, the BIA began with the language of § 
1101(a)(48)(A) itself, which defined “the term ‘conviction’ as 
‘a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.’”  
Id. at 686.  The Oregon circuit court had issued a formal 
judgment finding Eslamizar guilty of the offense of third-
degree theft.  Id.  The BIA said that, “[a]lthough a literal 
reading of the conviction definition persuaded us earlier that 
the respondent’s offense was a ‘conviction’ for immigration 
purposes, on reconsideration we do not find the definition to 
be clear or to dictate such an outcome.”  Id. at 686-87.  In 
particular, the earlier supposed clarity actually rested on the 
assumption that, by using “the phrase ‘judgment of guilt,’” 
“Congress meant only that the adjudicative finding of a court 
must carry the label ‘guilt’ or ‘guilty.’”  Id. at 687.  Such a 
reading represented an unlikely construction given its 
consequences.  Id.  Specifically, “it would mean that if a State 
has so denominated, or in the future should so denominate, a 
civil judgment, e.g., one for an intentional tort or for conduct 
that results in a judgment to pay a civil fine or punitive 
damages, such a judgment would evidently qualify as a 
‘conviction’ for immigration purposes.”  Id.  Although some 
civil sanctions could be punitive in nature (and even trigger 
the Double Jeopardy Clause), the BIA in Eslamizar doubted 
that Congress “had so expansive a reach in mind” given the 
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absence of any persuasive evidence to support such a reading.  
Id. 
 
The BIA therefore “adopt[ed]” what it called “a far 
more sensible reading” of § 1101(A)(48)(A): 
 
Moreover, a far more sensible reading of 
the statute exists:  namely, that by “judgment of 
guilt” Congress most likely intended to refer to 
a judgment in a criminal proceeding, that is, a 
trial or other proceeding whose purpose is to 
determine whether the accused committed a 
crime and which provides the constitutional 
safeguards normally attendant upon a criminal 
adjudication.  Such a meaning, which we adopt, 
is consistent with the ordinary connotation of 
the term “guilt,” especially in the context of a 
definition of the term “conviction.” 
 
Id.  
 The agency then provided a summary of the state law 
that applied to Eslamizar’s trial.  Id.  On the one hand, the 
BIA recognized that Oregon law “uses the label ‘criminal’ to 
describe the hybrid ‘violation’ adjudication proceedings,” 
such trials were subject to the criminal procedure laws of the 
Oregon, and the defendant possessed the rights to confront his 
or her accusers, file an appeal, and hear the evidence of 
witnesses in open court.  Id. (citations omitted).  On the other 
hand: 
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. . . Oregon’s offense classification system 
defines “crimes” and “violations” in mutually 
exclusive terms, stating that “[a]n offense is 
either a crime . . . or a violation.”  Oregon law 
further provides that “[c]onviction of a violation 
does not give rise to any disability or legal 
disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.”  
Moreover, pursuant to section 153.076 of the 
Oregon Revised Statutes, violation proceedings 
are tried to the court sitting without a jury, the 
defendant need not be provided counsel at 
public expense, and the State need only prove 
the defendant’s violation by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Significantly, the Oregon Court 
of Appeals in State v. Rode concluded that the 
conduct of a defendant whose misdemeanor 
offense was prosecuted as a violation “was not a 
crime, and the prosecution of the conduct was 
not a criminal prosecution.” 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 The BIA then stated that “[i]t is a bedrock principle of 
the Constitution of the United States that each element of an 
offense or crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at 688 (footnote omitted) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).  It 
then added the following footnote to its statement of a 
“bedrock principle”: 
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The respondent’s “violation” carried a 
maximum penalty of a fine.  As such, if it were 
to be regarded as a crime, it would fall, for 
constitutional purposes, into the category of a 
“petty offense,” a species of misdemeanor that 
is punishable by a maximum of 6 months 
imprisonment and a fine of uncertain 
dimension, but probably not extending beyond 
$5,000 for individuals.  See 18 U.S.C. § 19 
(2000).  The Supreme Court has held that petty 
offenses do not carry the right to jury trial and, 
if no imprisonment will or may be imposed, 
may also dispense with the right to appointed 
counsel.  E.g.,, Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 
322 (1996); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 
(1979).  But we are unaware of any decision of 
that Court or any other holding that the standard 
of proof for conviction of even a petty offense 
may deviate below the level of “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” 
 
Id. at 688 n.4.  According to the BIA, “[i]t is beyond debate, 
therefore, that the respondent, who was found ‘guilty’ under 
the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence was 
not found guilty of his ‘violation’ in a true criminal 
proceeding.”  Id. at 688.   
 
The BIA went on to explain that there was nothing in 
the legislative history “to show that Congress intended 
anything by the phrase ‘judgment of guilt’ other than the 
normal and traditional meaning of a judgment entered in a 
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genuine criminal proceeding.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  On the 
contrary, Congress was primarily, if not exclusively, 
concerned with the effect of post-proceeding rehabilitative 
actions.  Id. at 668 n.5.  Noting that its decision should not be 
read as asserting that a foreign conviction must adhere to all 
the constitutional requirements applicable to criminal trials, 
including the requisite standard of proof, the BIA summarized 
its finding in the following terms:  “Rather we find that 
Congress intended that the proceeding must, at a minimum, 
be criminal in nature under the governing laws of the 
prosecuting jurisdiction, whether that may be in this country 
or in a foreign one.”  Id.  Finally, the BIA indicated that, to 
the extent its decision in In re C-R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 59 (BIA 
1958) (holding that police court adjudication of petty theft in 
violation of municipal ordinance under preponderance of 
evidence standard constituted conviction), may be viewed as 
inconsistent, that prior decision was overruled.  Eslamizar, 23 
I. & N. Dec. at 689. 
 
 In the present case, we are faced with serious 
disagreement as to what considerations or factors may be 
relevant in deciding whether a finding of guilt constitutes a 
conviction under Eslamizar and § 1101(a)(48)(A).   Both the 
BIA and the government have distinguished Eslamizar on the 
grounds that New Jersey law—unlike Oregon law—required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  In short, the finding of 
guilt at issue here purportedly constituted a conviction under 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A) because the municipal court entered a 
formal judgment of guilt under a “reasonable doubt” standard 
of proof and ordered Castillo to pay a fine as a form of 
punishment.  However, Castillo claims that the BIA violated 
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its own precedent in Eslamizar, which “outlined a series of 
factors that must be considered in determining whether an 
alien’s judgment qualifies as a conviction [under § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)], including but not limited to whether the 
sanctions resulting from such a conviction are punitive, 
whether the alien was provided with the constitutional 
safeguards normally attendant to a criminal adjudication, and 
whether a conviction for the offense gives rise to any 
disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a 
crime.”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 20 (citations omitted).)  As we 
recognized in our prior opinion in this matter, New Jersey law 
provided in 1994 that:  (1) disorderly persons offenses, such 
as shoplifting, constituted “‘petty offenses,’” as opposed to 
“‘crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this 
State;’” (2) “‘[t]here shall be no right to indictment by a grand 
jury nor any right to trial by jury on’ disorderly persons 
offenses;” and (3) “[c]onviction of such offenses shall not 
give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage.’”  Castillo, 
411 F. App’x at 502 (quoting § 2C:1-4(b)).  According to 
Castillo, “Defendants charged with disorderly persons 
offenses [also] have no blanket right to counsel.”  (Id. at 29-
30 (citing § 2C:1-4(b)). 
 
Simply put, we find the Eslamizar decision itself to be 
difficult to understand.  We acknowledge, for example, that 
the BIA emphasized what it called a “bedrock principle” of 
constitutional law—the requirement that each and every 
element of an offense must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 688 (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted).  In turn, it arguably drew a 
distinction between this applicable standard of proof and 
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other procedural considerations, such as the right to a jury 
trial or the right to appointed counsel.  Id. at 688 n.4.  We 
further note that the interpretation of Eslamizar and § 
1101(a)(48)(A) proffered by the government does seem 
relatively simple to apply, i.e., instead of conducting an open-
ended multi-factor analysis, the decision maker simply 
considers whether a court entered a formal judgment of guilt 
under the “reasonable doubt” standard of proof and imposed 
some form of punishment.  More broadly, it is uncontested 
that “the INA’s definition of a ‘crime’ and a ‘conviction’ 
controls the determination of whether a finding of guilt for an 
offense is considered a ‘conviction for a crime.’”  
(Petitioner’s Brief at 30.)  
 
Nevertheless, we believe that Castillo generally offers 
the more persuasive interpretation of Eslamizar and § 
1101(a)(48)(A).  We reach this conclusion based on the 
language and reasoning of this difficult decision.  We also 
look to subsequent precedential and non-precedential BIA 
decisions purportedly applying Eslamizar.  Some of these 
decisions actually appear to weigh in favor of Castillo’s 
interpretation.  At the very least, it is clear that, far from 
clarifying a problematic en banc decision, the agency has 
approached its own decision in an inconsistent fashion. 
 
In Eslamizar, the BIA expressly rejected a literal 
reading of the term “conviction.”  Id. at 687.  On the contrary, 
it stated that “a far more sensible reading of the statute exists, 
namely, that by ‘judgment of guilt’ Congress most likely 
intended to refer to a judgment in a criminal proceeding, that 
is, a trial or proceeding whose purpose is to determine 
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whether the accused committed a crime and which provides 
the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon a 
criminal adjudication.”  Id.  This reading, “which we adopt,” 
did not expressly reference the applicable standard of proof.  
Id.  In turn, the BIA generally referred to “a true criminal 
proceeding,” “the normal and traditional meaning of a 
judgment entered in a genuine criminal proceeding,” and a 
proceeding that, at a minimum, is “criminal in nature under 
the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction, whether 
that may be in this country or in a foreign one.”  Id. at 688 
(footnotes omitted).  The agency also provided a full 
summary of Oregon law, including the state’s definition of 
crimes and violations in mutually exclusive terms, a statutory 
provision stating that a conviction of a violation does not give 
rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on 
conviction of a crime, and another state statutory section 
providing that violation proceedings are tried by a court 
sitting without a jury and without counsel being provided at 
public expense.
2
  Id. at 687. 
                                                 
2
 We likewise did not really emphasize the applicable 
standard of proof in our prior opinion in this matter.  In 
summarizing Eslamizar, we instead pointed to other aspects 
of Oregon state law (i.e., its mutually exclusive definitions 
and the absence of any disability or legal disadvantage) and 
highlighted the BIA’s “understanding of the phrase ‘judgment 
of guilt’” as a “‘judgment in a criminal proceeding, that is, a 
trial or other proceeding whose purpose is to determine 
whether the accused committed a crime and which provides 
the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon 
criminal adjudication.’”  Castillo, 411 F. App’x at 502 
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Accordingly, we generally view Eslamizar as setting 
forth a general “criminal proceeding” approach to § 
1101(a)(48)(A).  Because it is a “bedrock principle” that each 
element of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a finding of guilt under a lesser standard could never 
be considered as a judgment in “a true criminal proceeding.”  
Id. at 688 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  The 
“reasonable doubt” standard of proof thereby represents a 
necessary condition for satisfying the BIA’s “criminal 
proceeding” reading.  However, this does not mean that a 
judgment was entered in a true or genuine criminal 
proceeding—and therefore constituted a conviction pursuant 
to § 1101(a)(48)(A)—merely because a court entered a 
formal judgment of guilt under the requisite “reasonable 
doubt” standard of proof and imposed a form of punishment.  
The “criminal proceeding” approach appears to contemplate a 
more “open-ended” inquiry before a decision maker can 
conclude that § 1101(a)(48)(A) has been satisfied.  The BIA 
accordingly indicated that there are several other factors that 
may be relevant in deciding if the judgment was entered in a 
true or genuine criminal proceeding, including how the 
prosecuting jurisdiction characterized the offense at issue, the 
consequences of a finding of guilt, and the rights available to 
the accused as well as any other characteristics of the 
proceeding itself.  At the very least, such factors appear to be 
                                                                                                             
(quoting Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 687)).   With respect to 
the standard of proof, we stated that Oregon’s violation 
proceedings differed from criminal proceedings because, 
“among other things,” the state was required only to prove 
guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. 
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relevant to the determination of whether the proceeding’s 
“purpose is to determine whether the accused committed a 
crime” and if it “provides the constitutional safeguards 
normally attendant upon a criminal adjudication.”  Id. at 687. 
 
Furthermore, this interpretation of Eslamizar has some 
support in subsequent decisions by the BIA.  We begin with 
an unpublished single-member decision indicating that a 
judgment did not constitute a conviction, despite the fact that 
the prosecution had to prove the elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In In re Bajric, A077 686 506, 2010 WL 5173974 
(BIA Nov. 30, 2010) (unpublished decision), the agency 
sustained an appeal from a bond decision filed by an alien 
who was convicted in a Missouri municipal court of stealing 
in violation of a municipal ordinance.  Id.   In deciding if this 
judgment was a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A), the BIA 
turned to Eslamizar.  Id.  While emphasizing the standard of 
proof and noting that certain constitutional protections, such 
as the right to a jury trial, need not be afforded in petty 
offense cases, the BIA “also recognized several other factors 
to be considered in determining whether a judgment would 
qualify as a “conviction” for immigration purposes.”  Id.  
“These include, but are not limited to, whether the sanctions 
resulting from such a conviction are punitive, whether there 
are constitutional safeguards normally attendant to a criminal 
adjudication, and whether a conviction for a municipal 
violation gives rise to any disability or legal disadvantage 
based on conviction of a crime.”  Id.  The BIA explained that, 
“[a]lthough the respondent’s 2008 municipal violation was 
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quasi-criminal in that each element had to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, his municipal violation clearly remained 
civil in nature in that it did not bar a prosecution for the same 
offense by the state, and his conviction for a violation of a 
municipal ordinance, unlike those for misdemeanors and 
felonies, is not admissible for impeachment purposes.”  Id.  
Because this municipal violation did not appear to meet the 
statutory definition under § 1101(a)(48)(A), the BIA believed 
that it was substantially unlikely that the government could 
establish that the alien was subject to mandatory detention on 
account of his conviction for two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude.  Id. 
 
In the decision now under review, the BIA cited to In 
re Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 2008), which 
determined that “an adjudication of guilt [of the offense of 
carnal knowledge], proved beyond a reasonable doubt, by a 
general court-martial qualified as a conviction under [§ 
1101(a)(48)(A)].”  (A6.)  In this published 3-member 
decision, the BIA turned to Eslamizar and explained that a 
court’s formal judgment of guilt falls within the language of 
§1101(a)(48)(A) if it was entered in a “‘genuine criminal 
proceeding,’” i.e., “a proceeding that is ‘criminal in nature 
under the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction.’”   
Id. at 486-87 (quoting Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 688).  
According to the agency, the alien’s guilt was determined in a 
genuine criminal proceeding because the proceeding at issue 
was criminal in nature under the laws of the prosecuting 
jurisdiction, the United States Armed Forces.  Id. at 487.  
Specifically, “there is no dispute that a general court-martial 
is a ‘criminal proceeding under the governing laws of the 
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United States Armed Forces, and the respondent’s general 
court-martial unquestionably resulted in the entry of a formal 
judgment of his ‘guilt’ beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Likewise, “a trial by court-martial does 
not infringe on the constitutional rights of an accused who is 
properly subject to military jurisdiction, despite the absence 
of some protections afforded civilian defendants, such as the 
right to a trial by jury.”  Id. (citations omitted) (footnote 
omitted).  The BIA emphasized that the protections of the Bill 
of Rights were available to members of the Armed Forces 
(except for those protections that were expressly or by 
implication inapplicable in this context), and service members 
thereby were accorded many of the same procedural rights as 
their civilian counterparts (e.g., the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to representation by 
counsel at public expense, and the right to call witnesses and 
present evidence).  Id. at 487 n.2.  As part of its “genuine 
criminal proceeding” analysis in Rivera-Valencia, the BIA 
thereby considered whether the proceeding at issue was a 
criminal proceeding under the laws of the prosecuting 
jurisdiction itself and specifically relied on considerations 
other than the applicable standard of proof. 
 
In In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 
2012), a 3-member panel then applied Rivera-Valencia—and 
Eslamizar—to a judgment entered by a Kansas municipal 
court finding the alien guilty of violating a city ordinance 
prohibiting the possession of marijuana, id. at 852-55.  
“Under our precedents, a formal judgment of guilt entered by 
a court qualifies as a conviction under [§ 1101(a)(48)(A)] so 
long as it was entered in a ‘genuine criminal proceeding,’ that 
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is, a proceeding that was criminal in nature under the 
governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction.’”  Id. at 852-
53 (quoting Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 486-87.  
According to the BIA, the judgment at issue was entered in a 
genuine criminal proceeding under the laws of Kansas 
because municipal court judges possessed the power to enter 
judgments of guilt and impose fines or incarceration in 
marijuana possession cases, the prosecution was required to 
prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
judgment of guilt represented a conviction for purposes of 
calculating a defendant’s criminal history.  Id.  The agency 
further rejected the alien’s specific contentions regarding the 
absence of an absolute right to be represented by appointed 
counsel (purportedly unlike the approach to appointment of 
counsel used in the state’s district courts) as well as the lack 
of a right to a jury trial.  Id. at 853-54.  Specifically, the BIA 
concluded that the municipal court trial qualified as a genuine 
criminal proceeding because, “[i]f the municipal court finds 
the defendant guilty, the defendant then has a constitutional 
and statutory right to appeal to a State district court for a trial 
de novo before a jury.”  Id. at 854 (citations omitted).  In any 
case, the BIA looked to Kansas state law in order to 
determine whether the judgment was entered in a genuine 
criminal proceeding under the laws of the prosecuting 
jurisdiction and, in turn, considered more than the applicable 
standard of proof.  The agency also noted that it did “not 
purport to address municipal or local judgments other than the 
particular Wichita judgment before us.”  Id. at 855 n.3.  
“Because such judgments vary widely across jurisdictions, 
each must be examined on its own merits.”  Id.  
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“‘Agencies are not free, under Chevron, to generate 
erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of their governing 
statutes.’”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (quoting 
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 
2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting)).   Accordingly, “‘[c]onsistency 
over time and across subjects is a relevant factor [under 
Chevron] when deciding whether the agency’s current 
interpretation is ‘reasonable.’”  Id. (quoting Marmolejo-
Campos, 558 F.3d at 920 (Berzon, J., dissenting)).   While it 
can change its own policies, the BIA acts arbitrarily if it does 
so without proffering a principled reason or explanation.  See, 
e.g. id. at 608. 
 
According to the government, the BIA’s interpretation 
of what constitutes a crime under the INA is entitled to 
deference, and we should defer to its legal conclusion in this 
matter.  However, we do not believe that Chevron deference 
would be appropriate in light of our discussion of Eslamizar 
as well as subsequent BIA case law.
3
  At the very least, the 
non-precedential decision in Bajric and the precedential 
decisions in Rivera-Valencia and Cuellar-Gomez weigh in 
favor of our interpretation of Eslamizar and a general 
“criminal proceeding” approach to § 1101(a)(48)(A).  We do 
acknowledge that, in two unpublished single-member 
                                                 
3
  We therefore need not—and do not—reach the 
question of whether we could accord Chevron deference to an 
unpublished decision by a single member of the BIA, see, 
e.g., De Leon v. Attorney General, 622 F.3d 341, 348-51 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (refusing to decide whether such decisions are 
entitled to deference under Chevron).    
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decisions addressing shoplifting offenses under New Jersey 
law, the BIA apparently concluded that such offenses were 
convictions under § 1101(a)(48)(1) and Eslamizar merely 
because the respective aliens were found guilty under a 
“reasonable doubt” standard of proof (and were ordered to 
pay fines).  See In re Delgado, A13 924 138, 2008 WL 
762624 (BIA Mar. 11, 2008) (unpublished decision), petition 
for review denied sub nom. Delgado v. Attorney General, 349 
F. App’x 809 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); In re Dilone, A44 
476 837, 2007 WL 2463936 (BIA Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished 
decision).  The BIA, to date, has offered no attempt to 
reconcile, reject, or otherwise explain its inconsistent 
decisions.  In fact, it has not even recognized that there may 
be a problem with its own decisions in the present context.  
We therefore are confronted here with a clear case of “erratic, 
irreconcilable interpretations.’”4  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 
F.3d at 604 (citation omitted). 
                                                 
 
4
 The BIA and the government have also turned for 
support to non-precedential case law from this Court.  In 
Hussein v. Attorney General, 413 F. App’x 431 (3d Cir. 
2010), the alien pled guilty before a New Jersey court of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a disorderly persons offense 
under New Jersey law, id. at 432.  We concluded that it was 
not unreasonable for the BIA to determine that this offense 
qualified as a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A) because the 
government had the burden of proving every element beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the alien willingly pled guilty, and the 
judge sentenced him to serve forty-two days in jail.  Id. at 
434.  In response to the alien’s attempt to compare his offense 
to the offense at issue in Eslamizar, we offered the following 
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interpretation of the BIA’s holding: 
 
Unlike the right to have each element of 
a crime proven “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
the Constitution does not entitle a person facing 
up to six months in jail the rights to indictment 
by a grand jury or to a trial by jury.  Blanton v. 
N. Las Vegas, [489 U.S. 538 (1989)]; Hurtado 
v. California, [110 U.S. 516 (1884)].  Thus, 
while the BIA referred to a number of 
procedural deficiencies in Eslamizar, it was the 
inadequate burden of proof that alone formed 
the basis for its holding. 
 
Id.  This Court in Burrell v. Attorney General, 347 F. App’x 
805 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), likewise rejected the alien’s 
contention that his convictions could not be crimes involving 
moral turpitude because they were all disorderly persons 
offenses under New Jersey law, id. at 807.  Noting the 
irrelevance of New Jersey’s own characterizations, we stated 
that the “proper inquiry is whether the offense was ‘a formal 
judgment of guilty of the alien entered by a court,’ and 
whether it therefore constitutes a conviction pursuant to [§ 
1101(a)(48)(A)].”  Id.  The alien’s convictions for unlawful 
taking of the means of conveyance, receipt of stolen property, 
and shoplifting all constituted formal judgments of guilt.  Id. 
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It is well established that we are not bound by our own 
non-precedential opinions.  See, e.g., 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 (“The 
court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions 
as authority.  Such opinions are not regarded as precedents 
that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full 
court before filing.”).  We further note that the decisions did 
not include a full analysis of either § 1101(a)(48)(A), 
Eslamizar, or the subsequent BIA decisions.  In fact, the 
Court in Burrell did not even cite to Eslamizar itself.  
Furthermore, we believe that the statement in Hussein that the 
“inadequate burden of proof . . . alone formed the basis” of 
the holding in Eslamizar, 413 F. App’x at 434, is best read as 
a statement that, given the arguments made by the parties, the 
burden of proof appeared to be the determinative factor (and 
not as a general observation about the relative importance of 
the various factors in Eslamizar or as a definitive holding 
about the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(48)(A)). 
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We will grant Castillo’s petition for review and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
As we have noted, “‘an agency can change or adopt its 
policies.’”  Id. at 608 (quoting Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 
696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “However, an agency ‘acts 
arbitrarily if it departs from its established precedents without 
announcing a principled reason for its decision,’” id. (quoting 
Johnson, 286 F.3d at 700), and, in any case, “any announced 
changes must be based on a permissible construction of the 
statute,’” id. at 608 n.19.  On remand, the BIA should 
consider the broader question we initially asked it to address 
in our prior opinion, i.e., whether Castillo was “‘convicted of 
[a] crime [ ]’” under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).”  Castillo, 411 F. 
App’x at 503; see also, e.g., id. (“While the statutory 
                                                                                                             
We reach a somewhat similar conclusion with respect 
to a Tenth Circuit opinion that briefly addressed Eslamizar 
(and actually represents the only precedential circuit court 
decision to have done so before our opinion).  In Gradiz v. 
Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007), the court observed 
that the BIA “found that a state-labeled ‘violation’ was not a 
conviction for purposes of § 1101(a)(48)(a) when it was 
adjudicated using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
rather than the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
id. at 1208.  According to the Tenth Circuit, “Eslamizar does 
nothing more than reaffirm our traditional standard that 
findings of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.  
However, the Gradiz court made these statements in the 
specific context of deciding that a no contest plea, probation, 
and deferred sentence qualified as a conviction under § 
1101(a)(48)(A), id. at 1207-08.   
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definition of ‘conviction’ may be found to assist in the 
analysis, even given that definition, one must still ask 
‘conviction’ of what.”).  In doing so, it should endeavor to 
provide an explicit justification for its answer to our question.   
In turn, the BIA should attempt to clarify Eslamizar and the 
agency’s reading of § 1101(a)(48)(A).  The agency is free to 
reconsider that problematic opinion, provided that it states a 
reasoned explanation for doing so and any announced 
changes are based on a permissible construction of the federal 
immigration statute.  Otherwise, the BIA should then 
determine whether—given New Jersey’s then-operative 
characterization of the shoplifting offense, the consequences 
of any finding of guilt under New Jersey state law, and the 
rights available to the accused as well as the other 
characteristics of the proceeding before the East Brunswick 
Municipal Court—the finding that Castillo was guilty of 
shoplifting was entered in a “criminal proceeding, that is, a 
trial or proceeding whose purpose is to determine whether the 
accused committed a crime and which provides the 
constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon a criminal 
adjudication,” Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 687.5 
                                                 
5
   We have also considered Castillo’s due process 
argument and find it to be without merit.  See, e.g., Castro v. 
Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In the 
removal context, due process requires that ‘an alien be 
provided with a full and fair hearing and a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence.’” (quoting Romanishyn v. 
Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2006))); Jean-
Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 n.4 (concluding that alien seeking 
discretionary relief from removal has no cognizable liberty or 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition 
for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                                                                                             
property interest subject to protection of Due Process Clause). 
